Abstract. This paper studies competition in prices and opening hours in a model with free entry. It is shown that under free competition market failures arise: Entry is excessive and opening hours are under-provided. The larger the demand elasticity, the larger market failures are going to be. Restrictions on opening hours aggravate this failure. We analyze the impact of a liberalization of opening hours. The model predicts that prices will remain constant in the short run but increase in the long run. Concentration in the retail sector will rise. Additionally, employment in the retail sector increases.
INTRODUCTION
This paper addresses the issue of opening hours in the retail industry and its liberalization. In the public and political debate this topic is controversial. Although there has been a substantial trend towards deregulation in recent years, the debate is still ongoing. Restrictions on business hours differ to a large extent between European countries. For instance, in the UK and Sweden opening hours in the retail industry are much more liberalized than in France or Norway. In Germany, opening hours were always highly regulated before being liberalized in recent years.
The focus in this paper is on the relationship between the liberalization of opening hours and the concentration in the retail sector. To this aim, a model of retail competition with free entry in the spirit of Salop (1979) is applied. However, in contrast to his model, competition between retailers takes place in two dimensions. First, retailers compete on prices and second they compete on opening hours. The question is whether the competitive outcome is optimal or whether restrictions on opening hours can improve total welfare. The model suggests that the competitive outcome without any restrictions on opening hours leads to market failures with excessive entry into the market and under-provision of business hours. Hence, restrictions on opening hours do not help to improve the market outcome. Even worse, regulating opening hours works in the opposite direction. By restricting opening hours even further entry is induced. Thus, restrictions on business hours are not adequate to improve welfare, they rather aggravate market failures. Departing from the usual assumption of inelastic demand we find that the result of under-provision of business hours in a competitive market remains robust. However, the degree of market failure rises the more elastic demand is going to be. Analyzing the impact of a liberalization of opening hours, the model indicates that in the short run F where entry and exit in the market is not possible F prices remain constant. However, in the long run with free market entry and exit, retail prices increase and the concentration in the retail sector increases. There may also be a positive effect on employment from liberalization as total industry opening hours increase.
Beyond the public debate the issue of business hours (and its liberalization) has attracted considerable interest in the literature. Particularly, models are developed in which the choice of opening hours acts as a strategic variable in competition. Early contributions are from de Meza (1984) , Ferris (1990) and Kay and Morris (1987) . Kay and Morris (1987) show under which conditions free competition may lead to excessive opening hours, however, they conclude from empirical evidence that this outcome is quite unlikely in reality. As the present paper, de Meza (1984) and Ferris (1990) use models based on Salop (1979) . Closest to the present paper is the study by Ferris (1990) . As the present paper, the study by Ferris builds on the Salop model, however, it differs in the way the benefit of extended shopping hours for consumers is modeled. In the present paper it is assumed that the benefit is independent of the location of a consumer on the Salop circle, whereas Ferris (1990) assumes that the benefit depends on the location of the circle. He assumes that the benefit is larger for consumers located further away. This difference in the model structure has an important impact on the results. Contrary to the present paper, Ferris (1990) finds that opening hours are excessive and that entry is insufficient. Assuming shopping hours to be linked to transportation costs has some appeal if the horizontal dimension in the Salop model is interpreted as physical location. However, this assumption seems less plausible if it is interpreted as a taste dimension.
Consequently, more recent models F also based on spatial models of product differentiation F make a clear distinction between the horizontal dimension and the impact of shopping hours on consumer utility. Inderst and Irmen (2005) consider a two-stage model with competition in prices and opening hours. In a model with two symmetric firms, firms can use shopping time strategically as an additional means to relax price T. Wenzel r 2010 The Author competition by choosing asymmetric opening hours. Similarly, Shy and Stenbacka (2008) analyze the retail industry where competition takes place in opening hours and prices. The focus of their study is on the impact of different shopping time flexibility assumptions. They study scenarios where consumers are bi-directional, i.e. if a shop is closed at their preferred shopping time, consumers can postpone or advance their shopping. Furthermore, they explore situations where consumers are either forwardor backward-oriented, i.e. they can either postpone or advance. Wenzel (2008) studies competition over opening hours between large retail chains and smaller competitors. While the former contributors use models where consumers are distributed uniformly along the time dimension, Shy and Stenbacka (2006) analyze a setting where consumers' ideal shopping times are distributed non-uniformly. However, they treat prices as being fixed.
The present paper differs from the existing literature in several ways: Following more recent contributions, we make an explicit distinction between the taste dimension and the impact of shopping hours on consumer utility. In this set-up we allow for free entry. Furthermore, opening hours are modeled as a vertical attribute as longer opening hours allow for a higher flexibility in the shopping behavior of consumers. Lastly, in Shy and Stenbacka (2008) and in Inderst and Irmen (2005) retailers are restricted to a discrete choice set of opening hours. In contrast, the present paper allows for a continuous choice of opening hours.
The paper takes an Industrial Organization view on the deregulation of shopping hours with completely symmetric retail firms and demonstrates that from this perspective there is no need for any regulations. Thus, the paper does not present a rationale for shop closing regulations, which can be observed in many countries. Potential reasons for policy-makers' tendency to regulate opening hours may lie outside the scope of this paper. One potential reason could be that regulations are imposed in order to protect small businesses (Morrison and Newman, 1983; Tanguay et al., 1995) . However, there may also be reasons for regulation that lie outside competition policy. For instance, Burda and Weil (2005) argue that shop opening regulations can make sense if people enjoy spending leisure time together. Furthermore, Thum and Weichenrieder (1997) argue that consumers may be heterogenous with respect to the benefits of extended opening hours: Double-income families may prefer less regulated shopping hours than traditional singleincome families. They explore the political economy of regulating shopping hours.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 describes the equilibrium under liberalized opening hours. Section 4 compares the competitive outcome to the socially optimal one. Section 5 describes the equilibrium under regulated opening hours and analyzes the impact of deregulation. Section 6 extends the base model to price-dependent demand. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
Liberalization of Opening Hours with Free Entry

THE MODEL
We adopt the well-known Salop (1979) model with a modification to incorporate opening hours. Consumers in this market have preferences over a horizontal dimension and over opening hours. 
Consumers
Consumers are uniformly distributed on a circle of circumference one, representing the horizontal dimension. The location of a consumer, denoted by x, is interpreted as his most preferred variety (or alternatively as his preferred shopping location). There is a disutility cost if no store offers this variety. In contrast to the recent approaches by Inderst and Irmen (2005) and Stenbacka (2006, 2008) , we model business hours as a vertical attribute, that is, all consumers have a preference for longer opening hours.
2
The idea is that longer opening hours increase consumers' flexibility in deciding when to go shopping. This may be relevant when consumers are ex ante uncertain about when they want to shop. Then, 'opening hours might incorporate a real options value by creating flexibility in the eyes of consumers' (Shy and Stenbacka, 2008, p. 32) . Another reason to model business hours as a vertical attribute lies in an argument by Kosfeld (2002) . He argues that consumers may be uncertain about the precise timing of opening hours of a store. Thus, stores with long opening hours (or the reputation of it) might be preferred by consumers.
Consumers have the following utility, U, if buying from store i:
where d i denotes the distance from the most preferred variety and the parameter t is the associated measure of transportation costs. The variable h i denotes the length of opening hours of the retailer's store while the 1. From a technical point of view, the extension used here is similar to Conrad (2006) and Economides (1993) . Economides (1993) analyzes firms' quality choices in the Salop model and Conrad (2006) studies firms' investment in environmentally friendly products. Similar approaches are also used to study advertising in media markets, for example Anderson and Coate (2005) or Choi (2006) . They introduce a variable reflecting nuisance of consumers due to advertising that affects consumers negatively and generates revenues, while we introduce a variable that reflects the length of opening hours that affects consumers positively, but entails a cost to the firm. 2. In the models by Inderst and Irmen (2005) and Stenbacka (2008, 2006) each consumer has an ideal shopping time. Consumers only care whether a store is open at that time or not. Thus, in their set-up, consumers do not care about the length of shopping hours per se as is the case in the present model. However, in their set-ups as well as in the present one, firms can attract a larger number of customers via extending opening hours.
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German Economic Review r 2010 Verein für Socialpolitik parameter y measures the benefit a consumer derives from an additional opening hour. The price, p i , that the consumer is charged is deducted from utility. The gross utility from consuming the retail product, V, is assumed to be high enough such that each consumer buys. Furthermore, it is assumed that each consumer buys a single unit of the retail product. In Section 6 we will allow for price-dependent demand. The total mass of consumers is normalized to one.
Retail stores
There are n retail stores, indexed by i, located equidistantly on the circle of circumference one. Without loss of generality store one is located at zero (one). The remaining stores are then located at 1=n; 2=n; Á Á Á ðn À 1Þ=n. All retail stores face identical, constant marginal costs of production of the retail good. For simplicity, these costs of production are normalized to zero. Stores also face costs for their opening hours: These costs amount to ðg=2Þh 2 i .
3 Hence, marginal costs of extending the opening time increase with the time already open. The economic rationale behind this assumption is that stores may have a higher wage bill when extending their business hours (e.g., overtime compensation, late night surcharges). Additionally, firms have to pay fixed costs of f for entering the market.
Competition between retail stores follows a two-stage game: In the first stage potential entrants can simultaneously enter the market or stay out. In the second stage, those retailers who entered the market decide on price and opening hours. These two decisions are made simultaneously by all active retailers. The time structure imposed here reflects the fact that the entry decision is a long-term decision and that prices and opening hours can be changed relatively quickly. 4 Respecting the time structure, we look for a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
To ensure that entry in the retail market is positive we make the following assumption:
EQUILIBRIUM
This section derives the equilibrium.
Static equilibrium
In a first step we look for equilibrium prices and opening hours given a fixed number of stores in the retail market. Given the symmetric structure of the model, we seek for an equilibrium in which all stores charge the same price and have identical opening hours. 5 We therefore consider the decision to be made by a representative store i. Take for instance the retail store located at x 5 0. Competition in this model is local and takes place between store i and its two neighboring stores, (i À 1) and (i þ 1). Starting with store (i þ 1), there is a consumer who is indifferent between buying from the shop located at x 5 0 and the shop located at 1=n. This marginal consumer F when firm i charges p i and is open for h i hours while the remaining (n À 1) retailers charge p and open for h hours F is implicitly given by
or explicitly by
Similarly, the retail shop faces a competitor located at ðn À 1Þ=n. The situation is symmetric, hence demand is given by 2x m . Demand depends positively on competitors' prices and negatively on the own price. Longer own opening hours increase demand, and extended business hours at competitors' stores reduce demand. With the cost structure imposed, profits of the representative store are
Retail stores decide simultaneously on prices and opening hours. The firstorder conditions for the representative firm i are given by
5. In the models by Inderst and Irmen (2005) and Shy and Stenbacka (2008) there exists also asymmetric equilibria in which a priori symmetric stores choose asymmetric opening hours and prices. 
Result 1. (i) The short-run equilibrium level of opening hours increases in y and decreases in n and g.
(ii) The short-run equilibrium price increases in t and decreases in n.
The equilibrium exhibits the expected properties of the equilibrium price. The price does not differ from the results obtained from a model without opening hours (see Tirole, 1988) . The price depends positively on the degree of product differentiation and negatively on the number of competitors in the market. The comparative static properties with respect to the equilibrium opening hours are more interesting. As it might be expected, opening hours depend positively on consumers' valuation for increased shopping time flexibility and negatively on the costs of opening hours. The main result, however, is that opening hours depend negatively on the number of retail stores operating in the market. The reason for this result lies in the fact that a larger number of stores reduces the price and hence reduces the benefit of attracting customers via extended opening hours [see equation (6)].
Equilibrium with entry
The analysis above has derived opening hours and prices when the number of stores in the market is fixed exogenously. Now, we determine the number of stores that enter in a free-entry equilibrium. The number of these stores is denoted by n c . Considering the prices and opening hours in the second stage [equations (7) and (8)], then n c satisfies the zero profit condition:
Solving for n c explicitly gives the equilibrium number of retail stores in the market:
6. Literally, the number of retail stores has to be an integer. However, this integer problem is neglected here, and the number of stores is treated as being continuous.
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r 2010 The Author German Economic Review r 2010 Verein für Socialpolitik Assumption 1 ensures that there is a positive number of entrants into the market. The associated price and opening hours are
The free-entry equilibrium is hence characterized by equations (10), (11) and (12).
Result 2. (i)
With free entry the number of retail stores decreases with f and y, and increases with t and g. (ii) Opening hours increase with f and y, and decrease with t and g. (iii) The price increases with f and y, and decreases with g. The impact of t on the price is ambiguous. Table 1 summarizes the comparative statics results. As expected, higher fixed costs of entry f reduce the number of firms and higher transportation costs t increase the number of retailers that enter. More interesting are the comparative statics results on the number of retailers with respect to the costs and benefits of opening hours. Higher costs for extending opening hours g lead to more stores, and a higher valuation for shopping time flexibility decreases the number of stores. The reasoning behind these results is the following: In equilibrium all stores have identical opening hours, no additional demand is attracted by longer opening hours. However, stores face the costs of opening. From the perspective in the first stage, these costs work like additional fixed entry costs. Thus, factors that lead to longer (shorter) opening hours work like an increase (decrease) in entry costs. Hence, a higher valuation for shopping time flexibility, leading to longer opening hours, results in a smaller number of stores. The opposite holds for the costs 
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German Economic Review r 2010 Verein für Socialpolitik of extending opening hours. This effect is an example of Sutton's endogenous sunk costs (Sutton, 1991) .
7
The comparative statics results concerning the length of opening hours are intuitive. Entry costs and consumers' preferences for extended opening hours let shops expand their business hours as both tend to reduce the number of stores. The reverse holds for the transportation costs and the costs for extending business hours. Both factors induce more stores to enter and thus, have a negative impact on the length of opening hours chosen by the retailers.
The price increases with the fixed costs f and valuation for shopping time flexibility y as these variables reduce the number of retail stores. Higher costs of extended business hours increase the number of stores and thus lead to a decrease in the price. The comparative statics property of the transportation cost parameter on the price is ambiguous. There are two effects at work, a direct one and an indirect one. The direct effect implies that for a given number of retail stores a higher t leads to higher prices [see equation (7)]. The indirect effect works via the number of stores. A higher t leads to more stores, and more stores lead to increased competition, and hence lower prices. Note that this indirect effect is stronger here than in the standard Salop model. The number of competitors on the choice of opening hours drives this result. A larger number of competitors reduces opening hours and hence more retailers can survive in the market as costs are lower. When the influence of opening hours is strong ðy 2 =g > tÞ, the indirect effect outweighs the direct one and larger transportation costs can lead to lower prices. However, when y 2 =g < t, the direct effect is stronger and prices increase due to an increase in transportation costs.
WELFARE ANALYSIS
Does competition provide the socially optimal outcome? This section determines the socially optimal number of retail stores and their business hours. Social welfare is here defined as the sum of consumer utility [equation (1)] and profits of the retail industry [equation (4)]. As prices are mere transfers between consumers and retailers they are irrelevant for the welfare analysis. Thus, social welfare, W, comprises four parts: The transportation costs of consumers, the benefit of extended opening hours, the costs due to opening hours, and the fixed costs of entry:
Welfare is maximized with respect to h and n. This gives the following firstorder conditions:
These two equations describe the social optimum. Inspecting the firstorder condition with respect to h it can be noticed that the opening hours chosen in the competitive market are optimal if the number of active firms is the optimal one (compare equation (14) with (8)). If the number of stores is too high (too low), opening hours are too short (long) in the market outcome compared with the social optimum.
Solving the two equations for n and h gives the optimal number of active firms and optimal opening hours:
and
Comparison with the free-entry equilibrium yields:
Result 3. Compared with the social optimum, the market outcome leads to excessive entry behavior and opening hours that are too short.
Result 3 presents the central finding of the paper. As in the original model by Salop (1979) entry is excessive. But in the present model the result of excessive entry has also an impact on the length of opening hours as it leads to an under-provision of business hours. The present model with free entry shows that opening hours are too short. Thus, further restrictions on opening hours are useless to correct for the market failure.
The literature delivers mixed welfare results. It is instructive to compare the results of the present paper with Ferris (1990) as this paper comes to the opposite conclusion. Ferris finds that shopping hours can be excessive and the number of stores that enter is too low. As in his model extended opening hours reduce transportation costs, the marginal value for extending opening hours is larger the more distant a customer. This makes opening hours an T. Wenzel r 2010 The Author 520 effective instrument to attract customers located further away (the marginal consumer), but leads to excessive opening hours since for the social welfare the average, and not the marginal, customer is relevant. This, in turn, reduces the incentives to enter as extended opening hours are costly. Hence, in equilibrium too few stores enter. In Shy and Stenbacka (2006) a monopoly firm provides inefficiently short service hours. The reason lies in the fact that the firm does not internalize the costs of consumers who have to shift their business transactions to times when stores are open. The same reason leads in Shy and Stenbacka (2008) to the result that stores in a duopoly do not extend opening hours beyond the social optimum. However, in a set-up with a partially served market, a monopolist may provide business hours that are too long from a welfare perspective. Similarly, in the model by Clemenz (1994) a monopolist extends opening hours beyond the social optimum. The reason in his model is that by extending opening hours a monopolist can attract more demand and hence raise prices.
REGULATION OF OPENING HOURS AND LIBERALIZATION
This section studies the impact of liberalization. Therefore, in a first step, we describe the outcome when opening hours are regulated. To analyze the impact of deregulation, the outcome under regulation is compared with the competitive outcome in Section 3. Most of the results in this section follow directly from the welfare analysis.
Equilibrium under regulation
There is an upper limit on the hours a retailer may stay open, h. We focus on binding regulation, that is, retailers would like to choose longer opening hours but they are not allowed. This is ensured by
The free-entry equilibrium under regulation is then characterized by
Liberalization 
Note that there is a positive relationship between the degree of regulation and the number of stores. The tighter the regulation, that is, the lower h, the more stores enter the market. That shows that regulations on opening hours worsen the competitive outcome. Instead of reducing entry -as is socially desirable -it induces even more entry.
Impact of liberalization
The liberalization removes the limit h. We study the impact in two steps. The short-run impact assumes that the number of retailers is still at its preliberalization level. The long-run impact takes the change in the number of retailers into account.
Result 4. Impact of deregulation. (i) In the short run after a liberalization prices remain unchanged and opening hours are longer. (ii) In the long run the number of retailers decreases, the price increases, and opening hours increase compared with the pre-deregulation level and to the level immediately after deregulation. (iii) Liberalization leads to higher total industry opening hours.
Proof. (i) follows from equation (7) and the assumption on binding regulation. (ii) n c < n c , h < h cr , that holds under the assumption that regulation is binding. p c > p c , t=n c > t=n c . Since n c < n c this is true. To show
, which is true under the assumption of binding regulation.
Immediately after the liberalization the number of stores remains constant, so does the price. This result is consistent with the impact of deregulation in models without entry as long as stores choose symmetric opening hours. Under asymmetric configurations F one store opens longer or stores open at different times F prices may change due to deregulation (Inderst and Irmen, 2005; Shy and Stenbacka, 2008) . Opening hours increase as we assumed that regulation is binding.
In the long run the number of retailers will decrease. The reason for this lies in the fact that opening hours are longer after the liberalization. As this results in higher costs without generating additional demand in equilibrium, the number of retailers that can survive in the market is lower. Hence, a T. Wenzel r 2010 The Author long-run consequence of liberalization is a higher concentration in the retail sector. This increase in concentration leads to higher prices for the retail good but also to a further increase in the length of opening hours. The result of higher prices due to liberalization do not confirm the findings of de Meza (1984) and Clemenz (1990 ). de Meza (1984 finds that (for a fixed number of stores) prices are lower when shops are also allowed to open Sundays as the increased mobility of Sunday shoppers decreases firms' market power. In a model with consumer search Clemenz (1990) shows that liberalization of opening hours decreases prices as longer opening hours facilitate search activities.
Finally, total industry opening hours are higher after liberalization. If total industry opening hours can be interpreted as a measure of employment, liberalization of opening hours leads to more employment in the retail industry. This is consistent with empirical evidence. For example, Skuterud (2005) finds a positive employment effect due to deregulation of opening hours on Sundays in Canada. In his study, he estimates 8% to 12% more employment in the retail sector. Burda and Weil (2005) find evidence for the United States that restrictions on opening hours reduce (mainly part-time) employment.
PRICE-DEPENDENT DEMAND
In the base model it is assumed that each consumer buys a single unit of the retail good -independent of the price. In this section, we depart from this assumption and consider the case when the amount of the retail good bought by consumers depends on the price. However, we assume that the amount bought does not depend on the length of shopping hours. This assumption seems to be justified by empirical evidence (Skuterud, 2005) . Following Gu and Wenzel (2009) we assume the following utility function:
The utility function now includes a term to capture the impact of the quantity of the retail good ðe=ð1 À eÞq eÀ1 e i Þ. The parameter e[ð0; 1Þ denotes the demand elasticity. The variable q h denotes the consumption of a numeraire good whose price is normalized to one. We skip further derivations and directly proceed with the main results: The main result of the paper, namely the under-provision of business hours in a competitive equilibrium, is robust to the introduction of price-dependent demand. However, the degree of under-provision may be understated in models with inelastic demand as the gap between shopping hours chosen in a free-entry equilibrium and the ones that maximize social welfare widens as the demand elasticity rises. The reason is that the higher the demand elasticity the tougher is the competition (Gu and Wenzel, 2009) and hence this reduces the revenues that a retailer can earn from an additional customer. This, in turn, reduces the incentives to attract customer via costly shopping hours. Thus, shopping hours decrease with the demand elasticity. In the limiting case of e ! 1 shopping hours approach zero and the gap between socially optimal shopping hours and shopping hours provided in the market is at a maximum. As a side result we find F as in the paper by Gu and Wenzel (2009) F that entry into the retail market can be excessive or insufficient. In the base model the under-provision of business hours was due to excess entry into the market. Here another factor comes into play: The impact of the demand elasticity on the degree of competition.
CONCLUSION
This paper analyzes competition in business hours in an oligopoly model with free entry. It is shown that competitive markets lead to opening hours that are too short compared with the socially optimal level. The extent of under-provision of opening hours rises with an increasing demand elasticity. Regulations on opening hours do not attenuate the market failure but worsen the outcome. Studying the impact of a liberalization of shopping hours the paper shows that the impact in the long run differs from the short-run effect. While in the short run prices remain constant, in the long run they increase. This is due to the fact that after the liberalization retail market concentration rises. In accordance with empirical evidence the model predicts that employment in the retail industry should rise. This paper derives several hypotheses concerning the relationship between market structure and the regulation of shopping hours. For a given number of firms in the retail sector, the model predicts that a larger concentration in the retail sector leads to longer shopping hours. Furthermore, the model generates a negative relationship between the degree of regulation and retail concentration. The stricter the regulation, the lower is the retail concentration. It would be interesting to explore these questions empirically using cross-country data. Alternatively, the hypotheses can be stated concerning the impact of deregulation within a country. Following a deregulation, the model predicts concentration in the retail sector to rise, which in turn leads 
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